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COVID-19 and Public Accommodations Under the Americans with
Disabilities Act:
Getting Americans Safely Back to Restaurants, Theaters, Hotels and
“Normal”
By Frank Griffin, M.D., J.D.*
I. Introduction
COVID-19 permanently changed the legal landscape for public
accommodations—like restaurants, retail stores, theaters, gyms, hospitals,
and many other private entities—under Title III of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) by adding novel new obligations of which covered
entities must be cognizant to avoid discrimination against people with
newly definable disabilities.1 According to the CDC and researchers,
COVID-19 is likely to become endemic to the United States (US)
population, so these new legal obligations are unlikely to go away for the
foreseeable future.2

Dr. Griffin is an Adjunct Professor and Health Scholar in Residence at the University of
Arkansas School of Law and an Adjunct Clinical Assistant Professor, Division of
Orthopaedic Surgery, University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences.
1 42 U.S.C. § 12101.
2 Ruiyun Li, et al., Substantial undocumented infection facilitates the rapid dissemination of the
novel coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2), 368 SCIENCE 489, 492 (2020), available at
https://science.sciencemag.org/content/sci/368/6490/489.full.pdf (noting that prior to
COVID-19 there were already “four endemic coronavirus strains circulating in the
human populations,” and “[i]f the novel coronavirus follows the pattern of 2009 H1N1
pandemic influenza, it will also spread globally and become a fifth endemic coronavirus
within the human population.”; CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (CDC),
Principles of Epidemiology in Public Health Practice, Third Edition: An Introduction to Applied
Epidemiology and Biostatistics, available at
https://www.cdc.gov/csels/dsepd/ss1978/lesson1/section11.html (last visited May 25,
2020) (defining “endemic” as the constant presence and/or usual prevalence of a disease
or infectious agent in a population within a geographic area”); BLOOMBERG NEWS, Virus
likely to keep coming back each year, say top Chinese scientists, (April 27, 2020), available at
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-28/virus-is-here-to-stay-and-likelyseasonal-say-chinascientists?utm_campaign=news&utm_medium=bd&utm_source=applenews (noting that
it is “unlikely the new virus will disappear” because “it infects some people without
causing obvious symptoms like fever” creating a group of “asymptomatic carriers” who
*
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Historically, “society has tended to isolate and segregate
individuals with disabilities,” which created a “serious and pervasive
social problem.”3 The ADA was enacted in 1990 to “remedy widespread
discrimination against disabled individuals” including “outright
intentional exclusion as well as the failure to make modifications to
existing facilities and practices.”4 The ADA was also intended to integrate
people with disabilities into “the economic and social mainstream of
American life”—including popular public accommodations like
restaurants, movie theaters, arenas, museums, and other public venues. 5
According to the Supreme Court, allowing discrimination based on
the contagiousness of a disease is “inconsistent with the basic purpose” of
the ADA of ensuring that people with disabilities are “not denied . . .
benefits because of the prejudiced attitudes or the ignorance of others.”6
In finding that a person with tuberculosis can be a protected person with a
disability, the Court noted that contagiousness gives rise to an unusually
high level of “fear and apprehension” in society leading to “myths and
fears about . . . disease [that] are as handicapping as the physical
limitations” caused by the disease.7 Similarly, AIDS and even
asymptomatic HIV infections have been found to be protected disabilities
under the ADA.8

can “spread the virus undetected,” and stating that this is “very likely to be an epidemic
that co-exists with humans for a long time”).
3 PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 674-75 (2001).
4 Id. at 675.
5 Id.; see also Staron v. McDonald's Corp., 51 F.3d 353, 355 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 12101(b)(1)–(2)) (stating that the ADA was adopted “to provide a clear and
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against
individuals with disabilities,” and to establish “clear, strong, consistent, enforceable
standards’ for scrutinizing such discrimination”).
6 Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cty., Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987) (the court here refers to §
504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which Congress has made clear applies to the ADA, which
adopted the Rehabilitation Act’s definitions).
7 Id. at 284.
8 28 C.F.R. Pt. 36, App. C, § 36.104 (stating,
symptomatic HIV disease is an impairment that substantially limits a
major life activity; therefore it has been included in the definition of
disability under this part. . . . [and] asymptomatic HIV disease is an
impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, either because
of its actual effect on the individual with HIV disease or because the
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The endemic presence of COVID-19 creates several populations of
individuals that may face potential disability-related discrimination,
including, but not limited to (1) individuals hospitalized or severely ill
with COVID-19, (2) people with mild symptoms of COVID-19, (3) people
who have tested positive for COVID-19 but are asymptomatic, (4)
individuals who have been exposed to COVID-19, and (5) people who are
vulnerable to COVID-19-related morbidity or mortality due to other
disabilities. In some situations, affected individuals will be considered
“direct threats,” not disabled, or otherwise not covered by the ADA. But
in other cases, the public accommodation will have to make reasonable
modifications to their practices, policies, procedures, or structural barriers
to avoid discrimination as defined by the ADA.
This paper explores disability and discrimination under the ADA
with regard to customers and clients of public accommodations, along
with new obligations for reasonable modifications (including
controversial measures like fever checkpoints, mandatory masking, and
social distancing requirements) to accommodate this evolving group of
newly defined individuals and to avoid COVID-19-related discriminatory
practices.
II. Who must comply, what is prohibited, and who is protected
under Title III of the ADA?
Title III of the ADA applies to places of public accommodation (i.e.,
“covered entities”) and states the general rule that “[n]o individual shall
be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal
enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations of any place of public accommodation.”9 To establish a
prima facie case of discrimination under Title III of the ADA, the plaintiff
must show that (1) defendants own or operate a “place of public

reactions of other people to individuals with HIV disease cause such
individuals to be treated as though they are disabled.);
see also Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 647 (1998) (holding that asymptomatic HIV
infection to be a disability under the ADA).
9 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).
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accommodation,” (2) defendants discriminated against him “on the basis of
his disability,” and (3) he has a “disability.”10
A. Places of Public Accommodations
“Places of public accommodation” or “covered entities” under Title
III of the ADA generally include private entities affecting commerce
included in any of twelve categories including (1) places of lodging, (2)
establishments serving food or drink, (3) places of exhibition or
entertainment, (4) places of public gathering, (5) sales or rental
establishments, (6) service establishments, (7) specified places of public
transportation, (8) places of public display or collection, (9) places of
recreation, (10) private places of education, (11) social service centers, and
(12) places of exercise or recreation.11

See, e.g., Doe v. Deer Mountain Day Camp, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 2d 324, 340–41 (S.D.N.Y.
2010) (explaining, “In order to establish a prima facie case” under Title III of the ADA, the
plaintiff must “establish that: (a) he has a “disability”; (b) Defendants are owners or
10

operators of a place of “public accommodation”; and (c) Defendants discriminated
against him, on the basis of his disability.”).
11 42 U.S.C.A. § 12181 (listing the 12 categories of public accommodations including
(A) an inn, hotel, motel, or other place of lodging, except for an
establishment located within a building that contains not more than five
rooms for rent or hire and that is actually occupied by the proprietor of
such establishment as the residence of such proprietor; (B) a restaurant,
bar, or other establishment serving food or drink; (C) a motion picture
house, theater, concert hall, stadium, or other place of exhibition or
entertainment; (D) an auditorium, convention center, lecture hall, or
other place of public gathering; (E) a bakery, grocery store, clothing
store, hardware store, shopping center, or other sales or rental
establishment; (F) a laundromat, dry-cleaner, bank, barber shop, beauty
shop, travel service, shoe repair service, funeral parlor, gas station, office
of an accountant or lawyer, pharmacy, insurance office, professional
office of a health care provider, hospital, or other service establishment;
(G) a terminal, depot, or other station used for specified public
transportation; (H) a museum, library, gallery, or other place of public
display or collection; (I) a park, zoo, amusement park, or other place of
recreation; (J) a nursery, elementary, secondary, undergraduate, or
postgraduate private school, or other place of education; (K) a day care
center, senior citizen center, homeless shelter, food bank, adoption
agency, or other social service center establishment; and (L) a
gymnasium, health spa, bowling alley, golf course, or other place of
exercise or recreation).
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These twelve categories are “construed liberally to afford people
with disabilities equal access to a wide variety of establishments available
to the nondisabled.”12 More specifically, public accommodations include
many important mainstream American businesses and industries that
accommodate countless customers and clients annually like hotels,
restaurants, bars, movie theaters, sports stadiums, convention centers,
grocery stores, shopping centers, beauty shops, professional offices (like
doctors’ and lawyers’ offices), hospitals, public transportation stations,
museums, libraries, zoos, amusement parks, private schools, day cares,
food banks, gyms, and golf courses—just to name a few.13
B. Discrimination
Title III of the ADA “provides that [n]o individual shall be
discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment
of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations of any place of public accommodation.”14 Title III’s
divides prohibited behavior defined as “discrimination” into three
COVID-19-related categories.15 Note that causation (i.e., “on the basis of
disability”) is required in the definition of discrimination.
First, discrimination includes “the imposition or application of
eligibility criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a
disability . . . from fully and equally enjoying any goods, services,
facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations, unless such criteria
can be shown to be necessary.”16 A few examples discussed below of
possible eligibility criteria relevant to COVID-19 discrimination analysis
include denying entry to individuals based upon criteria related to
COVID-19 (e.g., positive tests, other disabilities, symptoms) or requiring
some type of documentation to allow entry (e.g., certificates of health,
“COVID-19 passports”) or rationing advanced health services like

PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 676–77 (2001) (finding that “golf tours” were
places of public accommodation).
13 42 U.S.C. § 12181.
14 Staron v. McDonald's Corp., 51 F.3d 353, 355 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a)).
15 42 U.S.C. § 12182(2).
16 Id.
12
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mechanical ventilation to people with pre-existing disabilities or with low
quality of life scores.
Second, discrimination includes “a failure to make reasonable
modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications
are necessary . . . , unless the entity can demonstrate that making such
modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of [the business].”17
Some examples of COVID-19-related potential “reasonable modifications”
of policies, practices, or procedures discussed below include alteration in
operating hours, cleaning procedures, employee testing, restriction of
visitors to hospitals and nursing homes, and requiring face masks, among
others.
Third, discrimination includes “a failure to remove [structural]
architectural barriers . . . where such removal is readily achievable” or
“where . . . the removal of a barrier . . . is not readily achievable, a failure
to [use] . . . alternative methods if such methods are readily achievable.”18
Structural barriers related to COVID-19 may include lack of barriers
between employees and customers in checkout lines or other places where
a prolonged encounter is possible, requiring entry (failing to provide
curbside checkout), and requiring entry through turnstiles or door
handles where contamination is possible, among others.
Further, places of public accommodation have an affirmative duty
to provide goods and services to people with disabilities in the “most
integrated setting appropriate to the needs of the individual” and should
not deny individuals with disabilities “the opportunity to participate in
such programs or activities that are not separate or different.”19 In
addition, associational discriminatory behavior includes excluding or
otherwise denying opportunities to “an individual or entity because of the
known disability of an individual with whom the individual or entity is

Id.
Id.
19 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (stating, “Goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and
accommodations shall be afforded to an individual with a disability in the most
integrated setting appropriate to the needs of the individual.”).
17
18
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known to have a relationship or association”—for example, someone who
has been exposed to a COVID-19 patient.20
C. Disability
The ADA defines “disability” with respect to an individual as (1) “a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life
activities of such individual,” (2) “a record of such an impairment,” OR (3)
“being regarded as having such an impairment.”21 To be considered as an
individual with a disability under the ADA, at least one of these three
“prongs”—referred to as the (1) “actual impairment prong,” (2) “record of
prong,” or (3) “regarded as prong,” respectively—must be fulfilled.22 The
statute specifically states that the definition of disability, including the
individual terms, “shall be construed in favor of broad coverage . . . to the
maximum extent permitted under this chapter.”23
Under the first two prongs, the terms “substantially limit” and
“major life activity” must be fulfilled. The term “substantially limits” is
not specifically defined, but Congress emphasized in the ADA
Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA) (after a series of court
misinterpretations)24 that “substantially limits” is “to be construed in favor
of broad coverage”—like the rest of the statutory definition of
“disability.”25 Congress emphasized that “the primary object of attention”
should be whether covered entities have complied with their obligations,
and the question of whether an individual's impairment is a disability
under the ADA “should not demand extensive analysis.”26 The
regulations indicate that an “impairment that is episodic or in remission is
a disability if it would substantially limit a major life activity when
active.”27

Id.
42 U.S.C. § 12102(1).
22 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (as denoted by the “or” connector in the definition, an individual
must only satisfy one prong to qualify as person with a “disability”).
23 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4).
24 Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999); ADA AMENDMENTS ACT OF
2008, PL 110–325, September 25, 2008, 122 Stat 3553.
25 ADA AMENDMENTS ACT OF 2008, PL 110–325, September 25, 2008, 122 Stat 3553.
26 Id.
27 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4).
20
21
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The statute includes a nonexclusive list of “major life activities”
that could be limited by an impairment.28 Severe cases of COVID-19 most
commonly affect the “major life activity” of “breathing,” but COVID-19
may also limit other major life activities like “caring for oneself,
performing manual tasks, . . . eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting,
bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking,
communicating, and working.”29 A nonexclusive list of “major bodily
functions” is also included in the definition of “major life activities.”30
COVID-19 affects most commonly the major bodily function of the
“respiratory system,” but also could affect the other listed systems,
“including but not limited to, functions of the immune system, . . .
digestive, bowel, . . . [and] circulatory . . . functions.”31 Importantly, an
individual vulnerable to COVID-19 complications or death may also have
a “disability” defined by these terms, and therefore, be covered by the
ADA.
The “regarded as” prong does not require the individual to
establish a substantial limitation of any major life activities. Instead,
[a]n individual meets the requirement of “being regarded as
having such an impairment” if the individual establishes
that he or she has been subjected to an action prohibited
under this chapter because of an actual or perceived physical or
mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is
perceived to limit a major life activity.32
The “regarded as” prong is Congress’ way of “acknowledg[ing] that
society’s accumulated myths and fears about disability and disease are as
handicapping as the physical limitations that flow from actual
impairment.”33 The statute includes a “transitory and minor” exception
for the “regarded as” prong stating it “shall not apply to impairments that

42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
Id.
30 Id.
31 Wei-jie Guan, et al., Clinical characteristics of coronavirus disease 2019 in China, 382 NEW
ENGLAND JOURNAL OF MEDICINE 1708, , 1708, 1716 (Table 3) (April 30, 2020), available at
https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMoa2002032.
32 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3).
33 Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cty., Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987).
28
29
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are transitory and minor.”34 A transitory impairment is defined in the
statute as “an impairment with an actual or expected duration of 6 months
or less.”35 This exception does not apply to the other prongs.
III. Evolving ADA Definitions and Requirements Related to COVID-19
COVID-19-related considerations are used here to divide the
population into COVID-19-related groups and to evaluate accommodation
and discrimination avoidance requirements based on COVID-19 status.
A. COVID-19-Related Disability Grouping of the Population
Disabled “clients or customers” of public accommodations are
protected by Title III of the ADA.36 To facilitate a discussion of the ADA’s
COVID-19-related requirements, these clients and customers can be
divided into groups related to their COVID-19 status. For purposes of
evaluation, this paper examines the following groups: (1) COVID-19
contagious or potentially contagious individuals, (2) COVID-19 survivors
with negative tests, (3) otherwise disabled individuals at high risk for
COVID-19 complications if they become infected, and (4) healthy, nondisabled individuals who are asymptomatic.37
1. COVID-19 Contagious or Potentially Contagious Individuals
Similar to individuals with other communicable diseases (e.g., HIV,
tuberculosis), individuals with active, confirmed COVID-19 and those

42 U.S.C. § 12102(3).
Id.
36 42 U.S.C. § 12182; see also Frank Griffin, COVID-19 and the Americans with Disabilities
Act: Balancing Fear, Safety, and Risk as America Goes Back to Work, 51 SETON HALL LAW
REVIEW --- (forthcoming November 2020) (discussing ADA obligations to employees—
including those of public accommodations—under Title I of the ADA).
37 Harvey Fineberg, Ten weeks to crush the curve, 382 NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF MEDICINE
e37 (April 23, 2020) available at https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMe2007263
(providing an example of population grouping based upon COVID-19 status by
differentiating everyone into five groups for health purposes including people with: (1)
active COVID-19 infections, (2) signs and symptoms of COVID-19 and therefore,
presumptively infected, but with negative tests (the tests have high numbers of false
negatives)(source: white house test), (3) known exposure to COVID-19, (4) no history of
COVID-19 exposure or infection, and (5) recovery from COVID-19 and possibly
immune).).
34
35
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potentially contagious (e.g., people with symptoms or with known
exposure to COVID-19) will require an individualized assessment under
the ADA to determine whether they qualify for disability protection.38
Here, the following subgroups of potentially COVID-19 contagious
individuals will be considered: (1) individuals with severe confirmed
COVID-19, (2) individuals with mild or asymptomatic cases of COVID-19
and those only exposed to COVID-19 or feared to have COVID-19 based
on symptoms, and (3) travelers to COVID-19 “hotspots.” In addition, the
concept of a “direct threat” in the context of these groups will be explored,
along with its implications on the disability rights under the ADA.
First, approximately 19% of COVID-19 patients in one study of
70,000 Chinese patients were classified as severe (14%) or critical (5%).39
Individuals with severe or critical cases of COVID-19 requiring
hospitalization or significant medical care qualify as individuals with a
disability under the “actual impairment” prong while they are severely ill
because during that time they have a “physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more major life activities.”40 Major life activities
often limited in severe cases of COVID-19 include “breathing” and the
“respiratory system” demonstrated by symptoms including labored
breathing, severe coughing, pneumonia, and sometimes even respiratory
failure requiring invasive mechanical ventilation.41 Other major bodily
functions under the ADA are also frequently substantially limited in

CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (CDC), Reducing Stigma, available at
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/daily-life-coping/reducing-stigma.html
(hereinafter CDC Stigma) (warning that communicable diseases, like COVID-19, often
expose society’s greatest myths, fears, and negative reactions leading to
“[s]tigmatization,” which is “especially common in disease outbreaks” and results in
“stigmatized groups [being] subjected to social avoidance or rejection,” among other
things).
39 Zonyou Wu and Jennifer McGoogan, Characteristics of and Important Lessons From the
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Outbreak in China: Summary of a Report of 72 314 Cases
From the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention, J AMERICAN MEDICAL
ASSOCIATION E1, E1 (February 24, 2020),
https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/2762130?utm_campaign=articlePDF%2
6utm_medium%3darticlePDFlink%26utm_source%3darticlePDF%26utm_content%3djam
a.2020.3204.
40 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1).
41 Wu, supra note 39, at E1 (reporting respiratory symptoms including coughing,
pneumonia, dyspnea, and respiratory failure).
38
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severe COVID-19 cases including the immune system (e.g., 83.2%
incidence of lymphocytopenia in one study), digestive system, circulatory
system, among others that can all substantially limit major life activities
like “caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, . . . eating, sleeping,
walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading,
concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working” due to issues like
severe fatigue, malaise, fever, muscle pain, and other COVID-19
symptoms.42 For example, in Arline, the Supreme Court found that the
teacher’s tuberculosis “affected her respiratory system” during her
hospitalization, and therefore, “Arline thus had a physical impairment . . .
affecting her respiratory system . . . serious enough to require
hospitalization, a fact more than sufficient to establish that one or more of her
major life activities were substantially limited by her impairment.”43 A
similar analysis will result for most COVID-19 patients with severe
COVID-19 during hospitalization or acute medical care, even if they are
only severely ill for relatively short periods of time because duration is
“only one factor” used in the assessment.44
Second, approximately 81% of individuals with COVID-19
infections in a study of 70,000 Chinese cases were mild and ranged from
having no symptoms at all (i.e., asymptomatic) to having mild pneumonia
or symptoms similar to the common cold.45 Individuals with mild or
asymptomatic COVID-19 and those who have only been exposed to
COVID-19 will not qualify as an individual with a disability under the
“actual impairment” or “record of” prongs of the ADA because they have
no physical impairment that substantially limits a major life activity—
similar to other mild injuries and diseases considered by courts. For
example, “a record of recovery from a minor laceration or the common

42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); Guan, supra note 31, at 1708, 1716 (Table 3).
Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cty., Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 281 (1987). 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i)
(1985).
44 76 FR 16978-01 Regulations To Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans
With Disabilities Act, as Amended (citing Joint Hoyer-Sensenbrenner Statement on the
Origins of the ADA Restoration Act of 2008, H.R. 3195 at 5) (explaining that the duration
of the impairment is “only one factor in determining whether the impairment
substantially limits a major life activity, and impairments that last only a short period of
time may be covered if sufficiently severe”).
45 Wu, supra note 39, at E1 (noting, “Most cases were classified as mild (81%; ie,
nonpneumonia and mild pneumonia).”).
42
43
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cold would not qualify for coverage under this definition.”46 Likewise,
broken bones and badly sprained joints typically heal in 6-12 weeks, but
courts find them insufficient to qualify as an actual disability under the
ADA.47 Similarly, short term or intermittent low back pain treated with
over-the-counter medications often fails to qualify as a disability with one
court explaining that a “temporary non-chronic impairment of short
duration is not a disability covered under the ADA.”48
However, an individual with mild or asymptomatic COVID-19 or
who has only been exposed to COVID-19 might qualify as an individual
with a disability (assuming they are not “direct threats”—see discussion
below) under the “regarded as” prong due to the associated stigma of
COVID-19, depending upon how courts ultimately view COVID-19 under
the “transitory and minor” exception to this prong. Under the “regarded
as” prong, the individual must only establish “that he or she has been
subjected to [a discriminatory action] because of [a] . . . perceived physical
. . . impairment.”49 The “regarded as” prong covers impairments that
“might not diminish a person’s physical or mental capabilities, but could
nevertheless substantially limit the person’s ability to work [or participate
in public accommodations] as a result of the negative reaction of others to
the impairment.”50 For example, Arline involved a school teacher with a
history of tuberculosis, an infectious disease, who was “regarded as”

Karl Menninger, Proof of “disability” under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 33 AM. JUR.
PROOF OF FACTS 3d 1 § 10 (March 2020 Update) (Originally published in 1995); see, e.g.,
Corning v. LodgeNet Interactive Corp., 896 F. Supp. 2d 1138 (M.D. Fla. 2012) (finding
that an individual could not establish a record of a disability without showing substantial
limits of a major life activity; record of his FMLA leave and his supervisor’s knowledge
of his kidney failure and chronic heart failure did not provide record of disability);
Jenkins-Allen v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 18 F. Supp. 2d 885 (N.D. Ill. 1998)
(holding that seven months of workers’ compensation leave for surgery on both hands
for carpal tunnel syndrome alone did not provide a record of disability); Maldonado v.
Cooperativa De Ahorro, 685 F. Supp. 2d 264 (D.P.R. 2010) (explaining that a record of
sleep apnea was not a record of impairment where it did not limit any major life activity).
47 See, e.g., Kruger v. Hamilton Manor Nursing Home, 10 F. Supp. 3d 385 (W.D. N.Y.
2014) (holding that a temporary broken arm was insufficient for finding a disability); see
also, Spath v Berry Plastics Corp. (1995, ND Ohio) 900 F Supp 893, 13 ADD 1080, 4 AD
Cas 1811 (finding a broken ankle insufficient).
48 Macfarlan v. Ivy Hill SNF, LLC, 675 F.3d 266, 274 (3d Cir. 2012).
49 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A).
50 Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cty., Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 283 (1987).
46
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having a disability by her school district because of her employer’s
unfounded fears.51
A “transitory and minor” exception is included in the “regarded
as” prong stating it “shall not apply to impairments that are transitory and
minor.”52 A transitory impairment is defined in the statute as “an
impairment with an actual or expected duration of 6 months or less.”53
COVID-19 has a median recovery time for individuals with mild cases of
only 2 weeks.54 So, the outcome of the individualized assessments will
likely depend upon whether courts view COVID-19 as “minor.” “Minor”
is not defined in the statue. For employment cases, the regulations state
that the “transitory and minor exception” “should be construed
narrowly.”55
Swine flu was tested in the courts under the transitory and minor
exception, where a Minnesota court found swine flu to be “minor” leaving
the employee unprotected by the ADA when he was fired at the “height of
. . . public hysteria” of the swine flu panic in 2009 because the employer
mistakenly “feared [the employee] had contracted the swine flu” while
traveling to attend his sister’s funeral.56 The Minnesota court ruled that
whether an impairment is “transitory and minor” is determined
objectively (i.e., “what matters is whether the impairment is, in fact,
transitory and minor”) and is not based upon what the defendant believed
at the time.57 The court compared swine flu morbidity and mortality
numbers to those of the seasonal flu to determine whether it qualified as

Id. at 273.
42 U.S.C. § 12102(3).
53 Id.
54 WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, REPORT OF THE WHO-CHINA JOINT MISSION ON
CORONAVIRUS DISEASE 2019 (COVID-19) 14 (February 2020), available at
https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/who-china-joint-mission-oncovid-19-finalreport.pdf#:~:text=Using%20available%20preliminary%20data%2C,severe%20or%20critic
al%20disease (hereinafter WHO Joint Mission).
55 29 C.F.R. § Pt. 1630, App., §1630.2(l).
56 Valdez v. Minnesota Quarries, Inc., No. 12-CV-0801 PJS/TNL, 2012 WL 6112846, at *1,
*3(D. Minn. Dec. 10, 2012).
57 Id. at *2–4 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(f)).
51
52
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“transitory and minor” because the “seasonal flu is undoubtedly
transitory and minor for purposes of the ADA.”58
In performing the comparison of swine flu to seasonal influenza,
the court considered the fact that there were a “total of 274,000
hospitalizations and 12,470 deaths in the United States due to swine flu
from April 2009 to April 2010” compared to CDC estimate of over 200,000
hospitalizations and up to 49,000 deaths annually from the seasonal flu in
the United States.59 Because the swine flu did not objectively result in
considerably more hospitalizations and deaths than the seasonal flu, and
because the seasonal flu is not to be considered a disability based on the
ADA’s legislative history, the court concluded “from an objective
standpoint, swine flu must be considered transitory and minor.”60
Therefore, this court found that swine flu could not be considered a
disability under the “regarded as” prong of the ADA’s disability
definition according to the court—so the fired worker was not protected
by the ADA in this case.61
If other courts follow the Minnesota court’s logic, the outcome of
the “regarded as” analysis for individuals with mild or asymptomatic
COVID-19 cases and those who have been exposed62 to COVID-19 may
depend upon how the “final” COVID-19 morbidity and mortality
numbers compare to those of seasonal influenza. According to some
researchers, comparisons of COVID-19 to seasonal influenza is not a valid
comparison.63 Those researchers point out that by May 2020,

Id.
Id. at *3.
60 Id. (relying on the fact that the swine flu “has a mortality and hospitalization profile
similar to that of seasonal flu, and the legislative history cites seasonal flu as the
paradigmatic example of a transitory and minor ailment.”).
61 Valdez v. Minnesota Quarries, Inc., No. 12-CV-0801 PJS/TNL, 2012 WL 6112846, at *3,
n3 (D. Minn. Dec. 10, 2012).
62 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (Individuals who have been exposed may also be protected against
associational discriminatory behavior includes excluding or otherwise denying
opportunities to “an individual or entity because of the known disability of an individual
with whom the individual or entity is known to have a relationship or association.”
However, this analysis is wrapped into the “direct threat” analysis below.).
63 Jeremy Faust, et al., Assessment of deaths from COVID-19 and from seasonal influenza,
JAMA INTERNAL MEDICINE E1, E1-E2 (May 14, 2020), available at
https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamainternalmedicine/fullarticle/2766121?guestAccess
58
59
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“approximately 65,000 people in the US had died of COVID-19,” which is
deceptively “similar to the estimated number of seasonal influenza deaths
reported annually by the CDC.”64 However, the researcher pointed out
that “[t]his apparent equivalence of deaths from COVID-19 and seasonal
influenza does not match frontline clinical conditions, especially in some
hot zones of the pandemic where ventilators have been in short supply
and many hospitals have been stretched beyond their limits.”65 The author
points out that the “demand on hospital resources during the COVID-19
crisis has not occurred before in the US, even during the worst of
influenza seasons.”66 The researchers speculate that the “root of such
incorrect comparisons may be a knowledge gap” related to how the data
are reported, and point out that seasonal influenza morbidity and
mortality are estimates based on hospital codes, but COVID-19 numbers
are based on “raw counts.”67 In other words, “COVID-19 fatalities are at
present being counted and reported directly, not estimated” like seasonal
influenza numbers.68
Those researchers suggest that weekly comparisons between
COVID-19 and seasonal influenza deaths are more valid. COVID-19
deaths during two weeks in April were 15,455 and 14,478 compared to the
peak week of influenza season from 2013 to 2020 when deaths ranged
from 351 in 2016 to 1626 in 2018 and the mean was 752.69 The researchers
observed that “[t]hese statistics on counted deaths suggest that the
number of COVID-19 deaths during a possible peak week in 2020 were
“9.5-fold to 44.1-fold greater than the peak week of counted influenza
deaths during the past seven influenza seasons in the US, with a 20.5-fold
mean increase.” 70 The reported deaths for the week ending April 11, 2020

Key=cb171e02-ae9a-4f40-97d4a69dc439a904&utm_source=For_The_Media&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=ft
m_links&utm_content=tfl&utm_term=051420.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Faust, supra note 63, at E1-E2.
69 Id.
70 Id.
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were “14.4-fold greater than influenza deaths during the apparent peak
week of the current [2020 flu] season.” 71
The researchers also noted that COVID-19 deaths “may be
undercounted owing to ongoing limitations of test capacity or falsenegative test results.”72 However, they acknowledge that “influenza
counts may be less reliable because adult influenza deaths are not
reportable to public health authorities, as are the case for COVID-19
deaths.”73 The researchers also acknowledge that some cities, “such as
New York City,” may include “some deaths that have been labeled as
having been caused by COVID-19 [but] are not due to COVID-19.”74
In addition, the authors state that “[c]ase fatality rates are another
topic of confusion” because comparisons of COVID-19 and influenza are
premature.75 At the time the article was written, “[e]stimates of case
fatality rates for COVID-19 ranged from less than 1% in some nations to
approximately 15% in others” with the wide range reflecting “limitations
in calculating case fatality rates” including testing differences and
incomplete follow-up.76
The CDC’s best estimate in late May 2020 is a case fatality rate of
0.4%, which is more in line with the researchers’ predictions in the above
study when looking at a cruise ship.77 The researchers in the above study
note that the Diamond Princess cruise ship is “one of the few situations for
which complete data are available, and the outbreak on that ship resulted
in a case fatality rate of 1.8% (13 deaths of 712 cases) resulting in an “age
adjusted” figure (to reflect the age of the general population) “closer to

Id.
Id.
73 Faust, supra note 63, at E1-E2.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (CDC), COVID-19 Pandemic Planning
Scenarios, available at https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/hcp/planningscenarios-h.pdf (hereinafter CDC Pandemic Planning); Arman Azad, CDC estimates that
35% of coronavirus patients don’t have symptoms, CNN Health (May 22, 2020), available at
https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/22/health/cdc-coronavirus-estimates-symptomsdeaths/index.html.
71
72
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0.5%.”78 However, “0.5% would still be 5 times the commonly cited case
fatality rate of adult seasonal influenza.”79 The researchers conclude,
“Although officials may say that SARS-CoV-2 is ‘just another flu,’ this is
not true,” but how courts ultimately interpret the data is hard to predict.80
Courts could possibly find that individuals with mild cases, asymptomatic
cases, and those who have only been exposed to COVID-19 are entitled to
ADA protections under the “regarded as” prong if COVID-19 is not
considered “transitory and minor.” However, these individuals could still
be disqualified for ADA protection under the “direct threat” exception
discussed below.
Third, travelers to COVID-19 “hotspots” and high risk areas are not
covered by the ADA based on a 2019 Eleventh Circuit decision where the
court declined to “expand the ‘regarded as’ disabled definition in the
ADA to cover cases . . . in which an employer perceives an employee to be
presently healthy with only the potential to become disabled in the future
due to voluntary conduct.”81 Presumably, similar logic would apply to a
public accommodation who refused goods or services to an otherwise
healthy recent traveler to a COVID-19 high risk area without intervening
quarantine time because the traveler would not qualify as an individual
with a disability under the ADA based on travel risk alone.
Finally, even if an individual has a disability defined by the ADA,
public accommodations can defend discriminatory actions if the
individual poses a “direct threat” to himself or others—as is sometimes
the case for infectious diseases. Title III says that covered entities are not
required “to permit an individual to participate in or benefit from the
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages and accommodations of
such entity where such individual poses a direct threat to the health or
safety of others.”82 “Direct threat” is defined as “a significant risk to the
health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by a modification of
policies, practices, or procedures or by the provision of auxiliary aids or
Faust, supra note 63, at E1-E2; see also Guan, supra note 31, at 1708 (finding a case
fatality rate of 1.4%).
79 Faust, supra note 63, at E1-E2.
80 Id.
81 Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. STME, LLC, 309 F. Supp. 3d 1207, 1212–13
(M.D. Fla. 2018), aff'd, 938 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. 2019).
82 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3).
78
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services.”83 The ADA’s definition of “direct threat” is a codification of the
Supreme Court’s articulated standard while holding that a person with a
contagious disease, tuberculosis, can be a person with a disability under
the law.84
Public accommodations cannot make generalized stereotypical
assumptions regarding contagious diseases and “direct threats.” The
Supreme Court explained, “The fact that some persons who have
contagious diseases may pose a serious health threat to others under
certain circumstances does not justify excluding from the coverage of the
Act all persons with actual or perceived contagious diseases.”85 The Court
observed, “Such exclusion would mean that those accused of being
contagious would never have the opportunity to have their condition
evaluated in light of medical evidence . . . . [r]ather, they would be
vulnerable to discrimination on the basis of mythology—precisely the
type of injury Congress sought to prevent.”86 Paradoxically, the EEOC has
done exactly that in one of its statements online, as discussed below.
To determine whether a particular individual poses a direct threat,
public accommodations much make “an individualized assessment, based
on reasonable judgment that relies on current medical knowledge or on
the best available objective evidence, to ascertain: (1) the nature, duration,
and severity of the risk; (2) the probability that the potential injury will
actually occur; and (3) whether reasonable modifications of policies,
practices, or procedures will mitigate the risk.”87 Without an
individualized assessment of these factors, any overly generalized policy
based on COVID-19 stereotypes or generalizations will likely be found
unlawful.88 Preferred sources for “current medical knowledge” include

Id.
Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cty., Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 273 (1987).
85 Id. at 285 (emphasis in original).
86 Id.
87 Anderson v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 342, 345 (D. Ariz. 1992).
88 See, e.g., Id. (citing Arline) (explaining that to protect “disabled individuals from
discrimination based on prejudice, stereotypes, or unfounded fear,” the Supreme Court
required an “individualized assessment” conforming to these requirements to insure that
“the determination that a person poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others [is]
not based on generalizations or stereotypes.”).
83
84
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“public health authorities, such as the U.S. Public Health Service, the
CDC, and the NIH.”89
So, for people who are contagious or potentially contagious with
COVID-19, the risks of the disease itself can first be assessed. In addition,
the characteristic of the specific public accommodation will be
considered—such as potential for distancing, likelihood of contact with
other patrons, etc.
For COVID-19, research continues to emerge and evolve. The first
factor includes the nature, duration and severity of the risk. The nature of
the risk for COVID-19 spread is person-to-person contact mostly. The
CDC says the virus is spread “between people who are in close contact
with one another (within about 6 feet)” “through respiratory droplets
produced when an infected person coughs, sneezes or talks.”90
Researchers note that a “key factor in the transmissibility of COVID-19 is
the high level of SARS-CoV-2 shedding in the upper respiratory tract, even
among pre-symptomatic patients.”91 With regard to duration, researchers
note that “public health authorities define a significant exposure to
COVID-19 as face-to-face contact within 6 feet with a patient with
symptomatic COVID-19 that is sustained for at least a few minutes (and
some say more than 10 minutes or even 30 minutes)” and that the “chance

Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 650 (1998) (stating, “In assessing the reasonableness of
petitioner's actions, the views of public health authorities, such as the
U.S. Public Health Service, CDC, and the National Institutes of Health, are of special
weight and authority.”).
90 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (CDC), How COVID-19 spreads,
available at https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/howcovidspreads.html?CDC_AA_refVal=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.cdc.gov%2Fcoronavirus%2F2019
-ncov%2Fprepare%2Ftransmission.html (hereinafter CDC How COVID-19 Spreads).
91 Monica Gandhi, et al., Asymptomatic transmission, the Achilles’ heel of current strategies to
control COVID-19, 382 NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF MEDICINE 2158, 2158 (May 28, 2020),
available at
https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMe2009758?query=recirc_curatedRelated_arti
cle?query=C19&cid=DM90829_NEJM_COVID19_Newsletter&bid=188147264https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMe2009758?qu
ery=recirc_curatedRelated_article?query=C19&cid=DM90829_NEJM_COVID19_Newsletter&bid=188147264.
89
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of catching COVID-19 from a passing interaction in a public space is
therefore minimal.”92
The severity of the risk, however, could be considered to be high
because severe illness and death can result from infection. Arline’s
language infers that “the significance of a risk is a product of the odds that
transmission will occur and the severity of the consequences.”93 “[I]t is the
potential gravity of the harm that imbues certain odds of an event with
significance.”94 As noted above, in one of the few available situations with
complete data, the case fatality rate aboard the Diamond Princess cruise
ship was 1.8% with an estimated age-adjusted general population risk of
0.5% of death associated with COVID-19 infection, which means that
around 1 in 200 people who get a COVID-19 infection will die.95 As noted
above, the CDC’s best estimate is 0.4% case fatality rate.96 This is four to
five times the risk associated with seasonal influenza. Since death is
permanent, an argument can be made that the duration of the risk is
permanent when viewed in this context.97 The Eleventh Circuit
specifically noted that “when the adverse event is the contraction of a
fatal disease, the risk of transmission can be significant even if the
probability of transmission is low: death itself makes the risk
‘significant.’”98
The second factor in evaluating a direct threat is the “probability
that the potential injury will actually occur,” which relates to the
contagiousness of COVID-19.99 As noted above, the Diamond Princess
cruise ship was one of the few contained situations where complete data
are available. On board that cruise ship were 3,711 people100 and 712 were

Michael Klompas, et al., Universal masking in hospitals in the COVID-19 era, 382 NEW
ENGLAND JOURNAL OF MEDICINE e63 (May 21, 2020), available at
https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp2006372?query=TOC.
93 Onishea v. Hopper, 171 F.3d 1289, 1297 (11th Cir. 1999).
94 Id.
95 Faust, supra note 63, at E1-E2.
96 Azad, supra note 77; CDC Pandemic Planning, supra note 77.
97 Faust, supra note 63, at E1-E2.
98 Onishea v. Hopper, 171 F.3d 1289, 1297 (11th Cir. 1999).
99 Anderson v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 342, 345 (D. Ariz. 1992).
100 Tina Saey, Cruise ship outbreak helps pin down how deadly the new coronavirus is,
ScienceNews (March 12, 2020), available at
92
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COVID-19 positive,101 which means that roughly 19% became infected in
the contained cruise ship environment over a few weeks. So, for cruise
ships, the probability of infection is likely around 19%. Since only 3.4% of
those infected will be hospitalized, the probability of hospitalization on a
cruise ship is less than 0.7%.102 The CDC estimates the general
populations’ overall case fatality risk to be 0.4% for those infected with
COVID-19, which means that the risk of COVID-19 death for the general
population being on a cruise ship with a COVID-19 outbreak is less than
0.08%.103 These risks may be even lower if new modifications to safety
protocols are implemented once cruise ships resume business after the
pandemic has abated.
A cruise ship is a contained environment for a prolonged period of
time with the same group of people, unlike most encounters in other
places of public accommodation; so, the probability would likely be much
lower in most other places of public accommodation. In addition, with
COVID-19 precautions and screening in place, the probabilities are likely
to be significantly altered even on a cruise ship today. Overall, the
probability that COVID-19 transmission will occur in a specific place of
public accommodation depends upon issues like social distancing, close
prolonged contact, location (outside versus inside), and the characteristics
of the population (e.g., age, comorbidities).
The third factor in the direct threat analysis is “whether reasonable
modifications of policies, practices, or procedures will mitigate the risk.”104
The CDC recommends avoiding exposure to the virus and taking steps to
slow the spread, including maintaining “good social distance (about 6
feet),” frequent hand washing, and regularly disinfecting surfaces.105
Analysis of reasonable modifications to mitigate direct threats are specific
to the public accommodation and an individualized assessment and are
discussed in detail below. If the risk can be mitigated by reasonable
https://www.sciencenews.org/article/coronavirus-outbreak-diamond-princess-cruiseship-death-rate (noting 3711 people on Diamond Princess).
101 Faust, supra note 63, at E2 (noting 712 positive COVID-19 cases on the Diamond
Princess).
102 19% x 0.034 = 0.646.
103 19% infected x 0.4% chance of dying = 0.076%.
104 Anderson v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 342, 345 (D. Ariz. 1992).
105 CDC How COVID-19 Spreads, supra note 90.

21

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL ONLINE

modifications, then individual is no longer considered a “direct threat”
under the ADA.
In summary, the direct threat analysis will be case and individual
specific. In some venues, the analysis will be completely different from
others. For example, in places where particularly vulnerable people
gather—like nursing homes—the analysis will be completely different
than places where mostly young people congregate—like playgrounds.
Given some of the controversies over this pandemic, courts may even
come to different conclusions under similar scenarios—so outcomes of
early individual cases may be difficult to predict.
For example, HIV infection has resulted in variability in court
opinions. “On one hand, the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits have
implicitly followed a cautious rule,” whereas the First Circuit ruled that
“not only must the danger be theoretically justifiable, it must also have
been realized in at least several cases.”106 In the “cautious circuits” even
small risks of HIV infection are significant where “a showing of a specific
and theoretically sound means of possible transmission was enough to
justify summary judgment against an HIV-positive plaintiff on the ground
that the infection posed a “significant risk” to others in the workplace,
even though reported incidents of transmission were few or nonexistent,
and the odds of transmission were admittedly small.”107 In contrast, the
First Circuit noted that a dentist “is not entitled to demand absolute
safety” in dealing with HIV positive patients and that “remote theoretical
possibility of HIV transmission through tears, saliva, and urine” were not
significant risks.108 Similarly the Ninth Circuit said “it was an error to
require that every theoretical possibility of harm be disproved.”109 Courts
may have similar difficulties discerning a consistent, clear path in early
cases involving COVID-19.
2. COVID-19 survivors with negative tests
COVID-19 survivors’ ADA status changes after recovery from
active infection from a medical and legal standpoint. From a medical
Onishea v. Hopper, 171 F.3d 1289, 1298 (11th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1297.
108 Id. at 1298.
109 Id.
106
107

22

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL ONLINE

standpoint, they are no longer shedding the virus, so they are not
contagious and therefore, are not a direct threat.110 In addition, they may
possibly be immune to COVID-19 because the infection produces
antibodies to COVID-19 that may be protective.111 From a legal
standpoint, the analysis also changes.
First, previously hospitalized and severely ill COVID-19 survivors
will continue to qualify as individuals with disabilities under the “record
of” prong of the ADA. People surviving severe or critical cases of COVID19 requiring hospitalization typically recover within three to six weeks.112
An individual who has fully recovered from COVID-19 and is no longer
positive for the virus no longer qualifies as an individual with a disability
under the “actual impairment” prong for their COVID-19 infection
because they no longer have a physical impairment (unless they acquired
a new disability during the infection).
However, the “record of” prong ensures that “people are not
discriminated against because of a history of disability.”113 For example,
the US military is considering excluding all applicants with a history of

CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (CDC), When can you be around others
after you had or likely had COVID-19, available at https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019ncov/if-you-are-sick/end-home-isolation.html (stating that it is safe for a person with
known COVID 19 to be around others when they have been afebrile for 3 days,
symptoms have improved, AND it has been 10 days since symptoms first appeared); see
also
Fei Zhou, et al., Clinical course and risk factors for mortality of adult inpatients with COVID-19
in Wuhan, China: a retrospective cohort study, 394 LANCET 1054, 1054 (2020), available at
https://www.thelancet.com/pdfs/journals/lancet/PIIS0140-6736(20)30566-3.pdf (stating,
“Median duration of viral shedding was 20·0 days (IQR 17·0–24·0) in survivors, but
SARS-CoV-2 was detectable until death in non-survivors. The longest observed duration
of viral shedding in survivors was 37 days. “).
111 Robert Kirkcaldy, et al., COVID-19 and post-infection immunity, JAMA Online (May 11,
2020), available at https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/2766097 (stating, “In
summary, existing limited data on antibody responses to SARS-CoV-2 and related
coronaviruses, as well as one small animal model study, suggest that recovery from
COVID-19 might confer immunity against reinfection, at least temporarily.”).
112 WHO Joint Mission, supra note 54 (Reporting, “Using available preliminary data, the
median time from onset to clinical recovery for mild cases is approximately 2 weeks and
is 3-6 weeks for patients with severe or critical disease.”).
113 29 C.F.R. § Pt. 1630, App.; 1630.2(k).
110
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COVID-19.114 Public accommodations could face scrutiny under the ADA
for any similar policy. To qualify under the “record of” prong, a record
that might be used to demonstrate disability could include education,
medical, or employment records, among others.115 For example, the
Supreme Court found that a teacher’s “hospitalization for tuberculosis . . .
suffices to establish that she has a ‘record of . . . impairment’ . . . and is
therefore a handicapped individual.”116 Therefore, COVID-19 survivors
who were hospitalized or otherwise received significant medical care with
serious or critical illnesses can likely qualify for ADA protection under the
“record of” a disability prong, since at the time of their hospitalization,
COVID-19 substantially limited major life activities.
Second, survivors of mild COVID-19 cases, asymptomatic COVID19 cases, and COVID-19 exposure cases could possibly be protected under
the “regarded as” prong if public accommodations discriminate against
them based on their prior COVID-19 history—as long as courts don’t
determine that COVID-19 is subject to the “transitory and minor”
exception discussed above. The “regarded as” prong helps fulfill the
ADA’s goal of protecting people due to the stigma that can “occur after a
person has been released from COVID-19 quarantine even though they
are not considered a risk for spreading the virus to others.”117
3. Disabled individuals at high risk for COVID-19 complications if they
become infected
Vulnerable individuals who are susceptible to COVID-19
complications including death may represent a new class of individuals
with disabilities under Title III of the ADA because they cannot fully and
equally enjoy the “goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or

Meghann Myers, Coronavirus survivors banned from joining military, Military Times
(May 6, 2020), available at https://www.militarytimes.com/news/yourmilitary/2020/05/06/coronavirus-survivors-banned-from-joining-the-military/ (circulating
a memo from the pentagon stating that “a history of COVID-19, confirmed by either a
laboratory test or clinician diagnosis, is permanently disqualifying”).
115 Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cty., Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 281 (1987).
116 Id.
117 CDC Stigma, supra note 38.
114
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accommodations” of places of public accommodation if they must
disproportionately risk their lives to participate.118
According to the CDC, people who are at “high-risk for severe
illness from COVID-19” are people age “65 years and older,” “[p]eople
living in a nursing home or long-term care facility,” and “people of all
ages with underlying medical conditions, particularly if not well
controlled.”119 “Underlying medical conditions” specifically mentioned by
the CDC include chronic lung disease, moderate to severe asthma, serious
heart conditions, immunocompromise caused by any health condition
(such as “cancer treatment, smoking, bone marrow or organ
transplantation, immune deficiencies, poorly controlled HIV or AIDS, and
prolonged use of corticosteroids and other immune weakening
medications”), severe obesity (BMI>40), diabetes, chronic kidney disease,
and liver disease.120 In a study of hospitalized patients in New York,
COVID-19 was found to be particularly dangerous to people with older
age, hypertension, obesity, and diabetes.121 In another study, the risk of
death from COVID-19 for hospitalized patients was markedly higher for
patients with these comorbidities than for younger, healthier patients.122
The risk of COVID-19 infection to these vulnerable individuals
substantially limit major life activities such as “caring for oneself” by
going to the grocery store and other places of public accommodation due
to the need to practice social distancing and “working” (especially for
individuals who work in an environment that requires contact with the
public).123 Therefore, new populations of high risk individuals may now
be considered to be disabled under the ADA because of the substantial
42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (emphasis added).
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (CDC), Frequently asked questions:
Higher risk, available at https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/faq.html#HigherRisk (hereinafter CDC Higher Risk).
120 Id.
121 Safiya Richardson, et al., Presenting characteristics, comorbidities, and outcomes among
5700 patients hospitalized with COVID-19 in the New York City area, 323(20) JOURNAL OF THE
AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION 2052, 2052 (April 22, 2020), available at
https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/2765184. (reporting the most common
comorbidities were hypertension (56%), obesity (41.7%), and diabetes (33.8%)).
122 Zhou, supra note 110, at 1054 (noting older age and other comorbidities as a significant
risk factors).
123 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
118
119
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limits placed upon their major life activities by the presence and risks of
COVID-19.
Specifically, for people at “higher risk of getting very sick from
COVID-19,” the CDC advises them to “stock up on supplies,” “take
everyday precautions to keep space between yourself and others,” “when
you go out in public, keep away from others who are sick,” “limit close
contact and wash your hands often,” and “avoid crowds, cruise travel,
and non-essential travel.”124 Further, the CDC says, “if there is an
outbreak in your community, stay home as much as possible.”125 If
followed, these CDC recommendations will substantially limit the ability
of vulnerable populations to participate in major life activities involving
public accommodations where crowds may gather or the risk of COVID19 exposure is significant. Therefore, many people previously not
considered to be disabled under the ADA may now be considered
disabled due to the restrictions related to their physical impairments that
put them at high risk of morbidity and mortality related to COVID-19.
The Second Circuit has found that individuals with special
susceptibilities—such as those vulnerable to COVID-19—are entitled to an
individualized assessment under the ADA. In Staron, customers
susceptible to cigarette smoke sought a total ban on smoking in
McDonalds’ restaurants.126 The Second Circuit held that a “fact-specific,
case-by-case inquiry” was required by the ADA to determination whether
this modification was necessary and that the smoke-sensitive customers
stated a triable cause of action for ADA violation.127 “Cases in which
individuals claim under the ADA that allergies to smoke constitute a
disability and require smoking restrictions are simply subject to the same
general reasonableness analysis as are other cases under the Act,”
including “the same case-by-case analysis that is applied to all other
physical or mental impairments.”128 The Second Circuit noted, “We see no

CDC Higher Risk, supra note 119.
Id.
126 Staron v. McDonald's Corp., 51 F.3d 353, 354 (2d Cir. 1995).
127 Id. at 356.
128 Id. at 357.
124
125
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reason why, under the appropriate circumstances, a ban on smoking
could not be a reasonable modification.”129
Some groups with special vulnerabilities—like significantly
increased risk of morbidity and mortality than the general population—to
COVID-19 may be analyzed differently now with regard to requests for
modifications to public accommodations to help protect them from
COVID-19 infection. Under the ADA, reasonable modifications are
required for individuals who qualify as having a disability either due to a
“physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major
life activities of such individual” or due to “a record of such an
impairment.”130 A few more controversial COVID-19 vulnerable groups
will be considered here as examples.
First, diabetes has been considered a “disability” and/or
“impairment” meeting the ADA definition in some courts and not in
others. For example, one court found that “[u]nder the ADA, qualified
individual with a disability is defined broadly and includes diabetics.”131
Similarly, the First Circuit found, “Insulin-dependent diabetes [is]
a physical impairment for purposes of determining whether plaintiff
[is] disabled within meaning of ADA.”132 Likewise, ADA employment
regulations state that “diabetes substantially limits endocrine function” as
one example of “substantially limits,” which implies that diabetes is a
disability.133 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit found, “Diabetes is a physical
impairment, which could qualify as a disability under the ADA, because it
affects the digestive, hemic and endocrine systems, and eating is a major
life activity.”134 In contrast, other courts have found diabetes, in itself, is
not a disability. For example, one court found, “Diabetes by itself does not
constitute a disability under the ADA unless it impairs an individual's

Id.
42 U.S.C. § 12102(1).
131 Schreiner v. City of Gresham, 681 F. Supp. 2d 1270 (D. Or. 2010).
132 Carreras v. Sajo, Garcia & Partners, 596 F.3d 25, 22 A.D. Cas. (BNA) 1601, 53 A.L.R.
Fed. 2d 609 (1st Cir. 2010).
133 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j).
134 Rohr v. Salt River Project Agricultural Imp. and Power Dist., 555 F.3d 850, 21 A.D. Cas.
(BNA) 964 (9th Cir. 2009).
129
130
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ability to work or engage in other major life activities.”135 Similarly,
another court found that an “employee's diabetic condition did not
substantially limit his major life activity of eating and, thus, was not
a disability under ADA.”136
Second, hypertension, at one time, was not considered a disability
if controlled on medications.137 However, Congress subsequently
modified the statute such that the “determination of whether an
impairment substantially limits a major life activity shall be made without
regard to the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures such as . . . [antihypertensive] medication [and] medical supplies.”138 The Sixth Circuit
found that “the activities affected by Plaintiff's hypertension [can]
constitute ‘major life activities’ because of their significance in the human
experience.”139 People with diabetes and hypertension may justifiably
substantially limit major life activities to comply with CDC
recommendations outlined above; therefore, under the ADA, these
impairments may be more likely to be classified as disabilities entitled to
ADA protection in the post-COVID-19 era. Under the same logic, many
other comorbidities like kidney disease, cancer, immunocompromise, etc.
will also likely qualify as disabilities under the actual disability prong
where they substantially limit a major life activity.
Third, even more controversially, severe obesity (BMI > 40) might
arguably be classified as a disability related to COVID-19 risks. Typically,
physical characteristics such as “height, weight, and muscle tone” are not
considered “impairments” by courts unless they result from an
“underlying physiological disorder.”140 For example, the Eighth Circuit
noted, “Taken as a whole, the relevant statutory and regulatory language
makes it clear that for obesity to qualify as a physical impairment—and

Diaz Rivera v. Browning-Ferris Industries of Puerto Rico, Inc., 626 F. Supp. 2d 244, 15
Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 1008 (D.P.R. 2009).
136 Griffin v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 661 F.3d 216, 25 A.D. Cas. (BNA) 551 (5th Cir.
2011).
137 Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 521 (1999).
138 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(4)(E) (West).
139 Williams v. Stark Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs., 7 F. App'x 441, 446 (6th Cir. 2001).
140 Morriss v. BNSF Ry. Co., 817 F.3d 1104, 1109–13 (8th Cir. 2016) (stating, “As with the
physical characteristics of height, weight, and muscle tone, “other conditions” are not
“impairments” unless they are the result of an underlying physiological disorder”).
135
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thus a disability—under the ADA, it must result from an underlying
physiological disorder or condition.”141 The Eighth Circuit concluded that
“for obesity, even morbid obesity, to be considered a physical impairment
[under the ADA], it must result from an underlying physiological
disorder or condition.”142 Similarly, the Sixth Circuit stated, “We decline
to extend ADA protection to all ‘abnormal’ (whatever that term may
mean) physical characteristics.”143 For employment purposes, EEOC
guidance states that “weight is merely a physical characteristic—not a
physical impairment—unless it is both outside the normal range and the
result of an underlying physiological disorder.”144 However, after
COVID-19, an individualized assessment, as required, might lead to a
different outcome today.
Finally, another controversial argument is that advanced age could
be considered a disability given the COVID-19 risks based upon age alone
documented by the CDC and studies noted above. “Advanced age, in and
of itself, is . . . not [traditionally] an impairment” under the ADA, but
“various medical conditions commonly associated with age” can
“constitute impairments” within the meaning of the ADA’s disability
definition.145 However, the CDC and medical studies cited above report
Id.
Id.
143 EEOC v. Watkins Motor Lines, Inc., 463 F.3d 436, 442–43 (6th Cir.2006) (the court
continued, “To do so ‘would make the central purpose of the statutes, to protect
the disabled, incidental to the operation of the “regarded as” prong, which would
become a catch-all cause of action for discrimination based on appearance, size, and any
number of other things far removed from the reasons the statutes were passed.’”).
144 Morriss v. BNSF Ry. Co., 817 F.3d 1104, 1109–13 (8th Cir. 2016).
145 29 C.F.R. § Pt. 1630, App.; see also N.A.A.C.P. v. Philadelphia Bd. of Elections, No. CIV.
A. 97-7085, 1998 WL 321253, at *4 (E.D. Pa. June 16, 1998) (“Being over the age of 65 is not
in and of itself an impairment, although medical conditions associated with age, such as
osteoporosis, can be. . . . The ADA requires reasonable modifications to accommodate
only those actually disabled, which may or may not include the elderly.”); Natarelli v.
New York State Office of Vocational & Educ. Servs. for Individuals With Disabilities, No.
607-CV-1130 GTS/GJD, 2009 WL 5204068, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2009), aff'd sub
nom. Natarelli v. VESID Office, 420 F. App'x 53 (2d Cir. 2011) (“Advanced age, in and of
itself, is not an impairment [for purposes of the ADA].”); Lee v. Se. Pennsylvania Transp.
Auth., 418 F. Supp. 2d 675, 679 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (“Age alone, however, is not a disability
for purposes of the ADA. Although many octogenarians do suffer from physical or
mental impairments that limit one or more of their major life activities and are therefore
“individuals with disabilities” as defined by the ADA, others remain physically and
141
142
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age greater than 65 as being a significant risk factor for COVID-19, which
could substantially limit multiple major life activities due to risks of
infection. However, getting a court to recognize age alone as an
“impairment” may be challenging. One exception may be elderly people
who are nursing home residents who may qualify as individuals with
disabilities simply because their presence in a nursing home portends
substantial limitations in major life activities like “caring for oneself” and
other activities required to live independently without assistance—
regardless of age.
4. Healthy, non-disabled individuals who are asymptomatic
People who have no comorbidities that could be defined as
disabilities and are having no symptoms of any illness are not covered
under the ADA because they have no impairment.
B. COVID-19-Related Disability Accommodations and Avoidance of
Discrimination
As discussed above, individuals with disabilities who are
susceptible to COVID-19 complications, as well as people possibly
contagious with COVID-19 are likely to be protected individuals with
disabilities by the ADA under some circumstances. Potentially
discriminatory practices against COVID-19-related disability groups
includes implementation of eligibility criteria, failure to make reasonable
modifications, and failure to remove structural barriers to allow these
groups to fully and equally enjoy places of public accommodation.146
People with disabilities are guaranteed “more than mere access to public
facilities”; they are guaranteed “full and equal enjoyment,” not just what
is “necessary.”147 Specifically, “[p]ublic accommodations must start by
mentally healthy well into their ninth or tenth decade.”); Lee v. Se. Pennsylvania Transp.
Auth., 418 F. Supp. 2d 675, 679 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (“Age alone, however, is not a disability
for purposes of the ADA.”); Natarelli v. New York State Office of Vocational & Educ.
Servs. for Individuals With Disabilities, No. 607-CV-1130 GTS/GJD, 2009 WL 5204068, at
*4 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2009), aff'd sub nom. Natarelli v. VESID Office, 420 F. App'x 53 (2d
Cir. 2011) (“the Court notes that advanced age, in and of itself, is not a recognized
“disability” for purposes of Title II of the ADA.”).
146 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).
147 Baughman v. Walt Disney World Co., 685 F.3d 1131, 1135 (9th Cir. 2012); 42 U.S.C. §
12182(a).
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considering how their facilities are used by non-disabled guests and then
take reasonable steps to provide disabled guests with a like experience.”148
For example, a movie theater is required to provide companion seating for
a person with a disability, not just the wheelchair seat—to provide an
equal opportunity to enjoy a movie with a companion.149
Public accommodations should consider enacting three types of
changes to deal with COVID-19-related disabilities under the ADA
including (1) addressing COVID-19-related “direct threats” in a nondiscriminatory manner, (2) making reasonable modifications to policies,
practices, and procedures to protect people with disabilities defined by
COVID-19, and (3) removing structural barriers impacting people with
COVID-19-related disabilities.
1. Addressing COVID-19-related “direct threats” in a non-discriminatory
manner
Under Title III, covered entities are not required “to permit an
individual to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages and accommodations of such entity where such
individual poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others.”150 The
definition of an “individual with a disability” excludes “an individual
who has a currently contagious disease or infection . . . and who, by
reason of such disease or infection, would constitute a direct threat to the
health or safety of other individuals.”151 However, places of public
accommodation also have an affirmative duty to include people with
disabilities in the “most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of the
individual.”152 In addition, disability discrimination includes “the
imposition or application of eligibility criteria that screen out or tend to
screen out an individual with a disability . . . from fully and equally

Baughman v. Walt Disney World Co., 685 F.3d 1131, 1135 (9th Cir. 2012).
Id. (the court also notes that movie theater wheelchair seating cannot simply be in
uncomfortable positions like the front row because this does not provide “full and equal
enjoyment”).
150 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3).
151 Onishea v. Hopper, 171 F.3d 1289, 1296–97 (11th Cir. 1999).
152 42 U.S.C. § 12182.
148
149
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enjoying any goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations, unless such criteria can be shown to be necessary.”153
To identify and accommodate or deny access to individuals who
pose direct threats, public accommodations are likely to rely on COVID19-related eligibility criteria related to physical exam findings (e.g., fever
checks with thermometers and with infrared scanning, visual inspection
for outward signs of infection like coughing or sneezing) or related to
medical inquiries (e.g., symptom inquiries, health attestation
requirements, health “passports” or certificates, vaccination records).
Safety requirements “must be based on actual risks and not on mere
speculation, stereotypes, or generalizations about individuals with
disabilities”—so the science behind some of these criteria will be briefly
explored below.154
Interestingly, in March 2020, the EEOC included the following
statement on its website:
Based on guidance of the CDC and public health
authorities as of March 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic meets the
direct threat standard. The CDC and public health authorities
have acknowledged community spread of COVID-19 in the
United States and have issued precautions to slow the spread,
such as significant restrictions on public gatherings. In
addition, numerous state and local authorities have issued
closure orders for businesses, entertainment and sport
venues, and schools in order to avoid bringing people
together in close quarters due to the risk of contagion. These
facts manifestly support a finding that a significant risk of
substantial harm would be posed by having someone with COVID19, or symptoms of it, present in the workplace at the current
time. At such time as the CDC and state/local public health
authorities revise their assessment of the spread and severity

153
154

42 U.S.C.A. § 12182(2).
Baughman v. Walt Disney World Co., 685 F.3d 1131, 1137 (9th Cir. 2012).
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of COVID-19, that could affect whether a direct threat still
exists.155
The EEOC regulations are not binding and appear to contradict the
Supreme Court’s “direct threat” analysis by classifying the disease itself as
a “direct threat” rather than providing for an individualized assessment.156
As the Supreme Court has explained, “The fact that some persons
who have contagious diseases [like COVID-19] may pose a serious
health threat to others under certain circumstances does not justify
excluding from the coverage of the Act all persons with actual or
perceived contagious diseases.”157 Yet, the EEOC regulations for COVID19 lump everyone with the disease into the direct threat category
regardless of circumstances. Instead, to protect “disabled individuals
from discrimination based on prejudice, stereotypes, or unfounded fear,”
the Supreme Court requires an “individualized assessment” to insure that
“the determination that a person poses a direct threat to the health or
safety of others [is] not based on generalizations or stereotypes.”158 Just
because a person has a contagious disease like COVID-19, HIV, or
tuberculosis does not mean that person is a “direct threat” in all
circumstances; for instance, a delivery service might safely deliver food
using contactless delivery to a person with COVID-19 while in the
hospital or inside their home without a direct threat occurring due to the
reasonable modification of contactless delivery.
Courts will not define “COVID-19” the disease as a “direct threat,”
instead they will conduct an individualized assessment as to whether the
specific individual with COVID-19 risk poses a “direct threat” based on
reasonable judgment that relies on current medical knowledge and the

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION (EEOC), Pandemic preparedness in
the workplace and the Americans with Disabilities Act, (Updated March 21, 2020), available at
https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/pandemic-preparedness-workplace-andamericans-disabilities-act.
156 Id. (the document notes: “The contents of this document do not have the force and
effect of law and are not meant to bind the public in any way. This document is intended
only to provide clarity to the public regarding existing requirements under the law or
agency policies.”).
157 Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cty., Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 285 (1987) (emphasis in original).
158 Anderson v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 342, 345 (D. Ariz. 1992).
155
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best available fact-specific, objective evidence.159 To make a
determination, courts will consider: “(1) the nature, duration, and severity
of the risk; (2) the probability that the potential injury will actually occur;
and (3) whether reasonable modifications of policies, practices, or
procedures will mitigate the risk.”160 During the analysis, public health
authorities, like the CDC, will be given “special weight and authority” for
current medical knowledge and evaluating “reasonable medical
judgments.”161 See Section III.A.1. above for more analysis of when
COVID-19 constitutes a “direct threat.”
As noted above, physical examinations and medical inquiries may
be employed by public accommodations as screening or eligibility criteria
in response to COVID-19 risks. Title III offers no specific guidance
regarding physical examinations and medical inquiries of customers and
clients by public accommodations,162 so Title I of the ADA’s restrictions on
employers may be instructive. The ADA prohibits employers from
requiring medical examinations and making “disability-related inquiries”
of their employees except under limited circumstances.163 Medical
examinations or inquiries for employees must be “job-related and
consistent with business necessity.”164 The EEOC defines a “medical
examination” as a “procedure or test that seeks information about an
individual’s physical or mental impairments or health.”165
Medical exams and inquiries are “consistent with business
necessity when an employer has a reasonable belief, based on objective
evidence, that . . . an employee will pose a direct threat due to a medical
condition.”166 Similar regulations could be promulgated for inquiries by
public accommodations, requiring a public accommodation to have a
“reasonable belief” that the individual poses a “direct threat” to other

Id.
Id.
161 Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 650 (1998).
162 42 U.S.C. § 12181.
163 EEOC, supra note 155.
164 Id.
165 Id. (To determine whether or not something is a “medical examination,” factors like
“whether the test involves the use of medical equipment” and “whether it is designed to
reveal the existence of a physical or mental impairment” are relevant.)
166 Id.
159
160
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customers, clients, or its employees. Public accommodations performing
medical examinations and inquiries will likely need to demonstrate these
measures do not screen out protected individuals with disabilities, that
they are a business necessity (e.g., to eliminate a direct threat), and that no
reasonable modifications can be made to prevent the discrimination. The
reliability of the “objective evidence” used to formulate a public
accommodation’s “reasonable belief” that a person poses a direct threat
will be important.
Fever checkpoints are one proposed medical examination or
inquiry to identify COVID-19 direct threats and are examined here as an
example of the analysis likely to apply to similar measures.167 For
example, the airlines and TSA are talking about “using airport security
screeners to perform temperature checks on passengers before they board
aircraft,” and some public accommodations are enacting similar
measures.168 In addition, infrared scanners may be used at large venues
(like stadiums) where the crowd can be scanned to identify people with
fevers.169
Fevers are not diagnostic of COVID-19 and more often identify
people with other disabilities or ailments than people actually infectious
with COVID-19, so the use of fever checkpoints as “objective evidence”
based on reasonable judgment relying on current medical evidence that a
person is a “direct threat” is questionable.170 One component of the
analysis of direct threats is “the probability that the potential injury will
actually occur,” and the probability that someone with a fever has
COVID-19 is likely going to be quite small in most locations—unless the

Alan Levine, et al., Airport screeners may check for fever under plan being discussed,
Bloomberg (May 1, 2020), available at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/202005-01/airport-screeners-may-check-for-fever-under-plan-being-discussed.
168 Id.
169 An Nguyen, et al., Comparison of 3 infrared thermal detection systems and self-report
for mass fever screening, 16(11) Emerging Infectious Diseases 1710 (2010), available at
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3294528/ ; Eva Xiao, COVID-19 raises
demand for temperature scanners, Wall Street Journal (May 21, 2020), available at
https://www.wsj.com/articles/coronavirus-raises-fever-for-infrared-skin-temperaturescanners-11590066006.
170 Anderson v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 342, 345 (D. Ariz. 1992).
167
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location is experiencing a major COVID-19 outbreak.171 For example,
roughly 0.1% of the US population may have been infected with COVID19 during the week of May 25, 2020, which means that 99.9% did not have
COVID-19—so if they had fever, it was likely from a different source.172
Further, most people with COVID-19 do not have fevers. The CDC
estimates that 35% of COVID-19 positive individuals have no symptoms
at all.173 Even in the COVID-19 patients that end up being hospitalized,
less than half have fevers upon presentation to the hospital.174 Therefore,
of those 0.1% of Americans with active COVID-19 on May 25, 2020, the
vast majority likely did not have a fever, and many likely had no
symptoms whatsoever. So, any fever found at a fever checkpoint is
unlikely to be related to COVID-19 in most scenarios.
Instead, the 99.9% of Americans without COVID-19 at the
checkpoint will likely have another explanation for the fever—some of
which may run afoul of the ADA. For example, around 17 million
Americans (representing 5.2% of the US population) live with a history of
cancer in the United States,175 and many of those individuals face multiple
Id.; Klompas, supra note 92, at e63 (explaining that “public health authorities define a
significant exposure to COVID-19 as face-to-face contact within 6 feet with a patient with
symptomatic COVID-19 that is sustained for at least a few minutes (and some say more
than 10 minutes or even 30 minutes)” and that the “chance of catching COVID-19 from a
passing interaction in a public space is therefore minimal.”).
172 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (CDC), CDC COVID data tracker,
available at https://www.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker/ (For example, for the week ending
May 25, 2020, there were 170,391 new cases of COVID-19 diagnosed); UNITED STATES
CENSUS BUREAU, U.S and world population clock, available at
https://www.census.gov/popclock/; The math: So, if the cases stay contagious for 3
weeks on average (conservative overestimate since CDC only recommends 14 days
quarantine) and the same number of cases were diagnosed during the previous three
weeks, a rough estimate of the total number of active cases of COVID-19 in the US on
May 25, 2020 is around 511,173 active COVID-19 cases (170,391 x 3), which represents
roughly 0.1% of the United States 329,701,500 people.
173 CDC Pandemic Planning, supra note 77; Azad, supra note 77.
174 Richardson, supra note 121, at 2052 (noting that fever was present in only 30.7% at the
time of hospital admission); Guan, supra note 31, at 1708 (finding 43.8% of the patients
had fever on admission).
175 Kimberly Miller, et al., Cancer treatment and survivorship statistics 2019, 69(5) AMERICAN
CANCER SOCIETY CA: A CANCER JOURNAL FOR CLINICIANS 363, 363 (2019), available at
https://acsjournals.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.3322/caac.21565 (noting that “more
than 16.9 million Americans with a history of cancer were alive on January 1, 2019)
171
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different causes of fever ranging from the cancer itself, to chemotherapy,
to immunocompromise, to fevers of unknown origin.176 These individuals
surviving cancer generally pose no direct threat to others—so policies and
procedures that function as eligibility criteria that tend to screen out people
with cancer will likely be found to constitute disability discrimination in
violation of the ADA.177
In addition, other causes of fever that are more common than
COVID-19 undermine the use of fever checkpoints to categorize people as
direct threats—even though the person with a fever may not qualify for
protection under the ADA. For example, adults experience an average of
two to four “common colds” per year, which can sometimes be
accompanied by fevers.178 In addition, seasonal influenza affects between
3 and 11% of the US population each year, which can also cause fevers.179
In many ways, fever checkpoints treat everyone with a fever as
though they are a direct threat in a way that stereotypes people just as the
ADA is designed to prohibit. More research on the prevalence of COVID19 in febrile populations and the effectiveness of fever checkpoints in
eliminating direct threats is needed to justify their widespread adoption.
Similar considerations will come into play when evaluating other types of
medical examinations and inquiries used by public accommodations to
identify and segregate individuals who may be “direct threats” under the
ADA.
2. Making reasonable modification to policies, practices, and procedures
to protect people with disabilities defined by COVID-19
As noted above, many COVID-19 vulnerable individuals could
qualify for protection under the ADA at places of public accommodation.
AMERICAN CANCER SOCIETY, Fever, available at
https://www.cancer.org/treatment/treatments-and-side-effects/physical-side-effects/lowblood-counts/fever.html (discussing multiple causes of fever in cancer patients).
177 42 U.S.C. § 12182(2).
178 Carol DerSarkissian, How often do adults get the common cold and who is at most risk,
WebMD (February 28, 2018), available at https://www.webmd.com/cold-andflu/qa/how-often-do-adults-get-the-common-cold-and-who-is-most-at-risk
179 Jerome Tokars, et al., Seasonal incidence of symptomatic influenza in the United States,
66(10) CLIN. INFECT. DIS. 1511, 1511 (May 2, 2018), available at
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5934309/.
176
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Disability discrimination includes “a failure to make reasonable
modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications
are necessary . . . , unless the entity can demonstrate that making such
modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of [the business].”180
The CDC recommends that vulnerable people at “higher risk of getting
very sick from COVID-19” practice social distancing, stay away from
people who are sick, limit close contact with other people, wash their
hands frequently, avoid crowds, avoid non-essential travel, and to “stay
home as much as possible,” among other recommendations.181 Public
accommodations should make reasonable modifications to their policies,
practices, and procedures to help facilitate this protected populations’
attempts to follow the CDC guidelines. Failure to make reasonable
modifications that do not fundamentally alter the business to protect
vulnerable individuals with disabilities could be found to be
discriminatory under the ADA by effectively denying services to those
populations by making the public accommodation inaccessible without
too high of a risk for serious injury.
Whether a particular modification is reasonable “involves a factspecific, case-by-case inquiry that considers, among other factors, the
effectiveness of the modification in light of the nature of the disability in
question and the cost to the organization that would implement it.” 182
Potentially “reasonable modifications” of policies, practices, or procedures
may include implementing face mask requirements, altering operating
hours (including special times exclusively for vulnerable populations),
health screening and testing of employees, implementing special cleaning
procedures, restriction of visitors to places where vulnerable populations
are known to congregate (e.g., nursing homes, hospitals), among others.
The need for these types of modifications will depend upon the
recommendations of public health authorities and on scientific evidence of
effectiveness proving the proposed modification is reasonable and
“necessary” under the statute.

42 U.S.C.A. § 12182(2).
CDC Higher Risk, supra note 119.
182 Staron v. McDonald's Corp., 51 F.3d 353, 356 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Baughman v. Walt
Disney World Co., 685 F.3d 1131, 1135 (9th Cir. 2012) (explaining that facilities “need
only make accommodations that are reasonable,” which can include an analysis of the
“costs of such accommodations, disruptions of their business and safety”).
180
181
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For an example of the analysis, face mask requirements are being
adopted by many public accommodations. Under the ADA, a face mask
requirement needs to be “reasonable,” “necessary,” and not
“fundamentally alter” the nature of the public accommodation to be
required.
Several factors make face mask requirements seem “reasonable.”
First, the CDC recommends that people “[c]over [their] mouth[s] and
nose[s] with a cloth covering when around others, including when [they]
have to go out in public, for example to the grocery store” to assist with
social distancing recommendations.183 Second, some large businesses are
already adopting masking policies; for example, the large airlines “all
adopted policies requiring that passengers wear face masks during
flights.”184 Third, at least one state governor has issued an executive order
stating that “[a]ll patrons in the Commonwealth [of Virginia] aged ten and
over shall when . . . spending time inside [buildings] cover their mouth
and nose with a face covering.”185 Fourth, universal masking might
arguably help prevent asymptomatic spread, which has been described as
an “Achilles heel” in containment strategies and may be particularly
important in places where vulnerable people congregate.186 Fifth, masks
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (CDC), Social distancing, available at
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/social-distancing.html
(hereinafter CDC Social Distancing) (stating, However, “[c]loth face coverings should
NOT be placed on children under age 2, anyone who has trouble breathing, or is
unconscious, incapacitated, or otherwise unable to remove the mask without
assistance.”).
184 Alan Levine, et al., Airport screeners may check for fever under plan being discussed,
Bloomberg (May 1, 2020), available at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/202005-01/airport-screeners-may-check-for-fever-under-plan-being-discussed.
185 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, Executive Order Number 63
(2020), Requirement to wear face covering while inside buildings, (Effective May 29, 2020),
available at https://www.governor.virginia.gov/media/governorvirginiagov/executiveactions/EO-63-and-Order-Of-Public-Health-Emergency-Five---Requirement-To-WearFace-Covering-While-Inside-Buildings.pdf.
186 Gandhi, supra note 91, at 2158 (noting that 71% of “presymptomatic persons had viable
viruse by culture 1 to 6 days before development of symptoms”); Melissa Arons, et al.,
Presymptomatic SARS-CoV-2 infections and transmissions in a skilled nursing facility, 382 NEW
ENGLAND JOURNAL OF MEDICINE 2081, 2081 (May 28, 2020), available at
https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMoa2008457 (showing rapid spread in a
nursing home population to 64% of residents within 23 days of the first positive test); but
see, Ruiyun, supra note 2, at 492 (noting that the “transmission rate of undocumented
183
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serve as “visible reminders of an otherwise invisible yet widely prevalent
pathogen and may remind people of the importance of social distancing
and other infection-control measures.”187 Finally, masks are “talismans
that may help increase . . . perceived sense of safety, well-being, and trust.
. . [Even if,] such reactions may not be strictly logical.”188
In contrast, whether or not face masks are “necessary” is much
more controversial. The effectiveness of masks outside of a health care
environment where workers are in direct contact with known COVID-19
positive patients is questionable at best. One group of researchers states,
“We know that wearing a mask outside health care facilities offers little, if
any, protection from infection.”189 The researchers explain that the “chance
of catching COVID-19 from a passing interaction in a public space is . . .
minimal” because a significant exposure to COVID-19 requires “face-toface contact within 6 feet with a patient with symptomatic COVID-19” for
possibly 10 to 30 minutes according to some “public health authorities.”190
These researchers note that universal masking and overuse may actually
be harmful by leading “to more transmission of COVID-19 if it diverts
attention from implementing more fundamental infection-control
measures” and by causing a “future risk of running out of masks and
thereby exposing [front-line] clinicians to the much greater risk of caring
for symptomatic patients without a mask.”191 Further, at least one
randomized control study found that cloth masks may actually increase
infection rates stating “the results [of their study] caution against the use
of cloth masks” with the “increased risk of infection” associated with cloth
masks due to “[m]oisture retention, reuse, . . . and poor filtration.”192
infections per person was 55% the transmission rate of documented infections, yet,
because of their greater numbers, undocumented infections were the source of 79% of the
documented cases.”); Klompas, supra note 92, at e63 (noting that the risks posed by
asymptomatic individuals is mitigated somewhat by the fact that the “transmission risk
from [asymptomatic infected people] is likely to be lower than the risk of spread from
symptomatic patients”).
187 Klompas, supra note 92, at e63.
188 Id.
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 C. Raina MacIntyre, et al., A cluster randomized trial of cloth masks compared with medical
masks in healthcare workers, 5 BMJ Open e006577 (2015), available at
https://bmjopen.bmj.com/content/5/4/e006577 (The researchers concluded that “as a
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However, a different study found that as a public health control measure,
if universal masking was adopted so that 80-90% of people wore masks in
public, then COVID-19 could be eliminated completely.193 These scientists
acknowledge that more research into the effectiveness of masking is
needed and will likely be performed.194
Face mask design likely plays a role in the effectiveness of any
masking recommendations. “Turbulent gas cloud dynamics [see
discussion below under distancing measures] should influence the design
and recommended use of surgical and other masks,” which “can be used
both for source control (i.e., reducing spread from an infected person) and
for protection of the wearer (i.e., preventing spread to an unaffected
person).”195 For example, the “protective efficacy of N95 masks depends
on their ability to filter incoming air from aerosolized droplet nuclei,” but
“these masks are only designed for a certain range of environmental and
local conditions and a limited duration of usage,” which may not be
effective under certain circumstances—including many of those advocated
in public accommodations.196
At present, without more research, a court would likely be hard
pressed to find that mandatory masking in most public accommodations
is “necessary” as an ADA requirement—although given the surprising
politization of the issue, legal challenge outcomes are likely to be
unpredictable and variable.
Finally, public accommodations might argue that masks
fundamentally alter the nature of their business. Although masking is
common in some cultures, it is not commonly practiced in the United
States and may make some patrons uncomfortable or unwilling to
participate in the public accommodation’s business—costing the business
customers and clients, especially in areas where masking has been
precautionary measure, cloth masks should not be recommended for health care
workers, particularly in high-risk situations, and guidelines need to be updated.”).
193 De Kai, et al., Universal masking is urgent in the COVID-19 pandemic, (submitted April
22, 2020), available at https://arxiv.org/pdf/2004.13553.pdf.
194 Id.
195 Lydia Bourouiba, Turbulent gas clouds and respiratory pathogen emissions: Potential
implications for reducing transmission of COVID-19, 323(18) JAMA 1837 (May 12, 2020),
available at https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/2763852.
196 Id.

41

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL ONLINE

politicized. Further, masking may cause some people anxiety as a
reminder of the pandemic and widespread fear surrounding them, just as
seeing people without masks causes others anxiety about possible
contagion (reasonable or not). One group of researchers viewed “the
desire for widespread masking” to be a “reflexive reaction to anxiety over
the pandemic.”197 Anxiety is likely present on both sides of this issue, so
the presence of masks might be seen as a fundamental alteration in places
of public accommodation in locations where the support for mandatory
masking is minimal.
Some special places of public accommodation involving health care
may be required by the ADA to adopt masking protocols since there is
more agreement on their effectiveness in these environments. One such
population is the 1.3 million Americans residing in nursing homes where
“symptom ascertainment may be unreliable in a group in which more
than half the residents [have] cognitive impairment,” so that they may be
less likely to report more subtle symptoms like sore throat, among
others.198 “Rapid and widespread transmission” of COVID-19 has been
demonstrated in skilled nursing facilities, and the case fatality rate in one
facility was 26%.199 Surgical masking of all nursing home staff and
visitors may also be an important measure according to some researchers.
200

In short, courts will likely decide whether requested modifications
under the ADA to policies, practices, or procedures—like mandatory face
masking—are reasonable and necessary using an individualized
assessment of the plaintiff and the public accommodation based on
emerging scientific evidence regarding the effectiveness of the requested
modification. Public accommodations would be well advised to follow
guidelines established by public health authorities like the CDC that do
not fundamentally alter their businesses, although their failure to do so
may or may not ultimately run afoul of the ADA.

Klompas, supra note 92, at e63.
Gandhi, supra note 91, at 2158.
199 Arons, supra note 185, at 2081.
200 Gandhi, supra note 91, at 2158.
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3. Removing structural barriers impacting people with COVID-19-related
disabilities
Public accommodations have an obligation to protect vulnerable
people with disabilities by making reasonable structural modifications to
allow protected individuals with disabilities the opportunity to practice
social distancing and follow other CDC recommendations while enjoying
their amenities. Public accommodations also have an obligation to
provide services to people with disabilities who may be contagious with
COVID-19 where doing so can be done safely.
Under Title III of the ADA, disability discrimination includes “a
failure to remove [structural] architectural barriers . . . where such removal is
readily achievable” or “where . . . the removal of a barrier . . . is not readily
achievable, a failure to [use] . . . alternative methods if such methods are
readily achievable.”201 “Readily achievable” modifications are those defined
as “easily accomplishable and able to be carried out without much
difficulty or expense.”202 “Difficulty” is not further defined, but the
Supreme Court has noted that the language of the statute “indicates that it
extends to considerations in addition to cost” and the determination
should “take into account the impact upon the operation of the facility.”203
The regulations provide a nonexclusive list of examples of barrier
removal and include some that may be related to protecting people who
are vulnerable to COVID-19 like “[r]earranging tables, chairs, vending
machines, display racks, and other furniture [e.g., to allow for “social
distancing”]; . . . [i]nstalling flashing alarm lights [e.g., for overcrowded
areas]; . . . [e]liminating a turnstile or providing an alternative accessible
42 U.S.C. § 12182(2).
42 U.S.C. § 12181(9); 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv).
203 Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 545 U.S. 119 (2005); 42 U.S.C. § 12181(9) (In
determining whether an action is readily achievable, factors to be considered include (1)
the “nature and cost” of the action needed, (2) “the overall financial resources of the
facility . . . ; the number of persons employed . . . ; the effect on expenses and resources,
or the impact otherwise . . .” (3) “the overall financial resources of the covered entity; the
overall size of the business of a covered entity with respect to the number of its
employees; the number, type, and location of its facilities,” and (4) “the type of operation
or operations of the covered entity, including the composition, structure, and functions of
the workforce of such entity; the geographic separateness, administrative or fiscal
relationship of the facility or facilities in question to the covered entity.”).
201
202
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path [e.g., to provide contactless entry]; . . . [and] [i]nstalling accessible
door hardware [e.g., to provide touchless entry and exit].”204 Other similar
COVID-19-related measures include installing barriers between customers
and employees, installing traffic flow arrows/signage and other types of
barriers to minimize contact between customers, installing markers in
areas where lines may accumulate to mark 6 feet intervals between
patrons, setting up entry points at stores that count and limit the capacity
of buildings to allow enough space for social distancing (e.g., limited
number of customers per square foot), placing hand sanitizer in strategic
locations, and providing curbside and/or contactless delivery (e.g., to
allow COVID-19 contagious individuals with disabilities to participate
safely). Public accommodations should be attentive to structural barriers
to physical distancing between patrons throughout their businesses,
including areas that might be neglected like elevators and shuttle buses.
Elevators may require special signage and may require a designated
employee to ensure one family/related group at a time to avoid prolonged
close contact between unrelated patrons
Most of the structural modifications noted above are designed to
allow vulnerable individuals to follow social distancing guidelines, and
ultimately, the legal analysis of the reasonableness of social distancing
rules and any ADA requirements will likely come down to their science.
The CDC recommends that people practice “social distancing,” which
includes “keeping space between yourself and other people outside of
your home” and “[l]imiting face-to-face contact with others.”205 The
CDC’s specific recommendations for social distancing include (1) staying
at least 6 feet from other people, (2) not gathering in groups, and (3)
staying out of crowded places, and (4) avoiding mass gatherings.”206
Public accommodations can make some of the structural modifications
noted above to help facilitate the CDC’s social distancing
recommendations, which the CDC says is “especially important for people
who are at higher risk for severe illness from COVID-19” in the vulnerable
population discussed above and protected by the ADA.207

28 C.F.R. § 36.304.
CDC Social Distancing, supra note 182.
206 Id.
207 Id.
204
205
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In contrast, the World Health Organization (WHO) takes a slightly
different stance with regard to social distancing than the CDC.208 WHO
says, “You can reduce your chances of being infected or spreading
COVID-19 by . . . . [m]aintain[ing] at least 1 meter (3 feet) distance
between yourself and others.”209 WHO explains that “[w]hen someone
coughs, sneezes, or speaks they spray small liquid droplets from their
nose or mouth which may contain virus,” and “[i]f you are too close, you
can breathe in the droplets, including the COVID-19 virus if the person
has the disease.”210 WHO also recommends “[a]void[ing] going to
crowded places” to allow you to maintain their 3 feet rule.211
The science behind these social distancing rules seems a little less
certain than the specific guidelines and will likely play a role in any ADA
requirements by courts. According to medical researchers, the CDC and
WHO recommendations are based on our “current understanding of the
routes of host-to-host transmission in respiratory infectious diseases [that]
are predicated on a model of disease transmission developed in the 1930s
that, by modern standards, seems overly simplified.”212 In the 1930s,
William F. Wells studied tuberculosis transmission and “dichotomized
respiratory droplet emissions into “large” and “small” droplets” (or
aerosols), which “mediate transmission of respiratory disease.”213
Subsequent “[i]nfection control strategies were then developed based on
whether a respiratory infectious disease is primarily transmitted via the
large or the small droplet route.”214 Today, this dichotomy of large versus
small droplets developed in the 1930s “remains at the core of the
classification systems of routes of respiratory disease transmission
adopted by the WHO . . . and . . . the CDC” with “arbitrary droplet
diameter cutoffs, from 5 to 10 micrometers” used to “categorize host-to-

WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, Coronavirus disease (COVID-19) advice for the public,
available at https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/advicefor-public.
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 Id.
212 Bourouiba, supra note 194, at 1837 (explaining that “[i]mplementing public health
recommendations based on these older models [from the 1930s] may limit the
effectiveness of the proposed interventions.”).
213 Id.
214 Id.
208
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host transmission as droplets or aerosol routes.”215 These classifications
“continue to underly current risk management, major recommendations,
and allocation of resources for response management association with
infection control” for COVID-19.216 The rapid international spread of
COVID-19 “even when maximum containment policies were enforced”
“suggests that using arbitrary droplet size cutoffs may not accurately
reflect what actually occurs with respiratory emissions, possibly
contributing to the ineffectiveness of some procedures used to limit the
spread of respiratory disease.”217
One new model for respiratory emissions shows that sneezes,
coughs, and exhalations “are primarily made of a multiphase turbulent
gas (a puff) cloud that entrains ambient air and traps and carries within it
clusters of droplets with a continuum of droplet sizes,” instead of only
“mucosalivary droplets following short-rang semiballistic emission
trajectories.”218 In this new model, the “locally moist and warm
atmosphere within the turbulent gas cloud allows contained droplets to
evade evaporation for much longer than occurs with isolated droplets,”
which extends “the lifetime of a droplet” by up to a factor of 1000, “from a
fraction of a second to minutes.”219 In addition, the forward momentum of
the cloud allows “pathogen-bearing droplets” of all sizes trapped in the
turbulent hot and moist gas cloud to be carried up to 23 to 27 feet (7-8
meters) depending upon environmental conditions in the ambient air like
temperature, humidity, and airflow.220 After the cloud evaporates (which
is “poorly understood”), some “residues or droplet nuclei” may “stay
suspended in the air for hours, following airflow patterns imposed by
ventilation or climate-control systems.”221 A report from China
“demonstrated that [COVID-19] virus particles could be found in the
ventilation systems in hospital rooms of patients with COVID-19 (5),”
which is “more consistent with the turbulent gas cloud hypothesis of
disease transmission than the dichotomous model [from the 1930s]

Id.
Id.
217 Bourouiba, supra note 194, at 1837.
218 Id.
219 Id.
220 Id.
221 Id.
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because it explains how viable virus particles can travel long distances
from patients.”222 The clinical implications of these finding is unknown.223
The WHO (3 feet) and CDC (6 feet) distance recommendations for
social distancing do not take into account “the possible presence of a highmomentum cloud carrying the droplets long distances” and the 3 to 6 feet
recommendations likely “underestimate the distance, timescale, and
persistence over which the cloud and its pathogenic payload travel, thus
generating an underappreciated potential exposure range.”224
Therefore, under the scrutiny of expert testimony in a court
proceeding, a requested structural modification may or may not be
determined to be objectively reasonable and necessary regardless of the
recommendations of public health authorities—although public
accommodations would be wise to make reasonable modifications where
readily achievable to accommodate the CDC’s recommendations. In
addition, public accommodations should find ways to remove barriers to
service of COVID-19 contagious individuals with disabilities safely where
possible.225
V. Conclusion
COVID-19 has permanently changed the way public
accommodations like restaurants, theaters, medical facilities, sports
arenas, gyms, and many other proprietors of mainstream American
activities must operate in order to accommodate people with COVID-19related disabilities under the Americans with Disabilities Act. The
required modifications will affect all clients, customers, and employees of
these establishments by changing the way that activities are conducted in
these venues.

Bourouiba, supra note 194, at 1837.
Id.
224 Id.
225 Onishea v. Hopper, 171 F.3d 1289, 1298 (11th Cir. 1999) (explaining that a dentist “is
not entitled to demand absolute safety” in dealing with HIV positive patients and that
“remote theoretical possibility of HIV transmission through tears, saliva, and urine” were
not significant risks—similar analysis will likely apply to COVID-19 regarding requiring
“absolute safety”).
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Newly defined COVID-19-related disability groups are emerging
under the ADA. The biggest and most diverse group of newly defined
individuals with disabilities includes vulnerable individuals who are
susceptible to COVID-19 complications and death due to underlying
medical conditions like diabetes, hypertension, moderate to severe
asthma, immunocompromise, severe obesity, old age, among others.226 In
addition, individuals actually impaired by severe cases of COVID-19,
survivors of severe cases of COVID-19, and individuals stigmatized due to
COVID-19 will be due special attention under the ADA by public
accommodations.
As discussed in depth above, public accommodations will need to
affirmatively take actions to allow people with ADA-defined disabilities
related to COVID-19 to fully and equally enjoy their goods and services by
implementing carefully thought out eligibility criteria necessary to
eliminate direct threats; by reasonably modifying policies, practices, and
procedures that do not fundamentally alter the nature of their businesses;
and by removing structural barriers where readily achievable. Continued
attention to emerging scientific and epidemiologic data will be important
for public accommodations to successfully navigate the complex and
controversial requirements potentially placed upon them by this latest
contagion. Measures like fever checks, mandatory face masking, and
required social distancing will continue to be scrutinized by scientists,
public opinion, and the legal community. Courts will likely struggle and
disagree in early evaluations of COVID-19-related requirements as
highlighted in this article—just as they have in the past with regard to
measures related to other contagious diseases like HIV and tuberculosis.
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CDC Higher Risk, supra note 119; Richardson, supra note 121, at 2052.
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